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1Abstract
This paper investigates the information in corporate credit ratings. We examine the
extent to which ￿rms￿credit ratings measure raw probability of default as opposed to
systematic risk of default, a ￿rm￿ s tendency to default in bad times. We ￿nd that credit
ratings are dominated as predictors of corporate failure by a simple model based on
publicly available ￿nancial information (￿ failure score￿ ), indicating that ratings are poor
measures of raw default probability. However, ratings are strongly related to a straight-
forward measure of systematic default risk: the sensitivity of ￿rm default probability
to its common component (￿ failure beta￿ ). Furthermore, this systematic risk measure is
strongly related to credit default swap risk premia. Our ￿ndings can explain otherwise
puzzling qualities of ratings.
JEL Classi￿cation: G12, G24, G33
Keywords: credit rating, credit risk, default probability, forecast accuracy, systematic
default risk1 Introduction
Despite recent criticism, credit ratings remain the most common and widely used measure of
corporate credit quality. Investors use credit ratings to make portfolio allocation decisions;
in particular pension funds, banks, and insurance companies use credit ratings as investment
screens and to allocate regulatory capital. Central banks use credit ratings as proxies for the
quality of collateral. Corporate executives evaluate corporate policies partly on the basis of
how their credit rating may be a⁄ected. Recent events and associated debate underline the
importance of understanding if ratings are appropriate for these purposes. Increased regulatory
pressure and discussion have focused on the role of credit ratings, possible shortcomings, and
suitable alternatives.
Before we can assess the suitability of credit ratings or embark on a search for alternatives,
it is important ￿rst to understand what credit ratings measure. Conventionally, credit ratings
are thought to provide information about the likelihood of default and other forms of corporate
failure.1 In this paper we examine the informational content of corporate credit ratings and
make two main contributions. First, we demonstrate that ratings are in fact a poor predictor of
corporate failure: they are dominated by a simple model based on publicly available information
at both short and long horizons and fail to capture relevant variation in default probabilities
across ￿rms. We show that the inferior performance of ratings is not driven by the fact that
ratings update only infrequently, nor because ratings use a discrete, ￿broad brush￿ranking.
These ￿ndings immediately raise the questions of what ratings agencies are measuring and why
investors and policymakers pay such close attention to ratings.
Our second main contribution is to show that ratings capture systematic default risk, the
tendency of ￿rms to default in bad times. A diversi￿ed and risk-averse investor will care about
both raw default probability and systematic risk, just as a corporate bond￿ s price depends
not only on its expected payo⁄ (which depends on its raw default probability) but also on its
discount rate or risk premium (which depends on its systematic default risk). However, to
the best of our knowledge, the potential relationship between rating and systematic risk has
1See, for example, West (1970), Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998), Krahnen and Weber (2001),
L￿› er (2004b), Molina (2005), and Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philippov (2009).
1received virtually no attention in the literature.2 We ￿nd that ratings are strongly related to
a straightforward measure of systematic default risk and that this systematic risk measure is
itself strongly related to credit default swap (CDS) risk premia.
Importantly, we show that idiosyncratic and systematic default risk are distinct from one
another; both are important for forecasting default, but credit rating is primarily related to
the systematic component of default probability. These results can explain why ratings are
poor predictors of raw default probability as well as other puzzling features of ratings, such
as the practice of ￿rating through the cycle.￿Our ￿ndings also imply that relying on a single
summary measure of credit risk, such as credit rating, results in a loss of relevant information
for the investor.
We begin by investigating the ability of credit ratings to forecast corporate default and
failure. Following Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) we de￿ne failure as the ￿rst of the
following events: bankruptcy ￿ling (chapter 7 or chapter 11), de-listing for performance-related
reasons, D (default) or SD (selective default) rating, and government-led bailout.3 We build on
recent models of default prediction (Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell
et al.)4 by constructing a straightforward predictor of default based on accounting data and
stock market prices in a dynamic logit model.
We ￿nd that this measure, which we refer to as ￿ failure score,￿is substantially more accurate
than rating at predicting failure at horizons of 1 to 10 years. The higher accuracy in predicting
the cumulative failure probability is driven by a much higher ability of failure score at predicting
marginal default probabilities at horizons of up to 2 years and the fact that credit rating adds
little information to marginal default prediction at horizons up to 5 years. Our results are
robust to correcting for look-ahead bias, using a discretized measure of failure score with
2One exception is Schwendiman and Pinches (1975) who show that lower-rated issuers have higher
CAPM beta.
3The broad de￿nition of failure captures at least some cases in which ￿rms avoid bankruptcy through
out-of-court renegotiations or restructurings (Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) and Gilson (1997)), or cases
in which ￿rms perform so poorly that they delist, often before subsequently defaulting.
4These papers build on the seminal earlier studies of Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), and Ohlsen
(1982). More recent contributions to the long and rich literature on using accounting and market-based
measures to forecast failure include Beaver, McNichols, and Rhie (2005), and Du¢ e, Saita, and Wang
(2007).
2the same number of categories as ratings, using recent ratings changes and outlook measures
(to rule out that our results are driven by ratings updating only infrequently), and allowing
predicted average default rates to vary over time.
We next investigate in more depth how credit ratings relate to default probabilities and
provide additional evidence that ratings are not primarily a measure of raw default probability.
We begin by presenting further motivation for using ￿tted failure probability as a benchmark
predictor of default: failure score explains variation in CDS spreads within identically rated
￿rms (i.e. the market views within-rating variation in failure probabilities as important);
in addition, failure probability is a signi￿cant predictor of a deterioration in credit quality as
measured by rating downgrades. Using ￿tted values as a measure of default probability, we then
relate ratings directly to default probabilities. Contrary to the interpretation that credit rating
re￿ ects raw default probability there is considerable overlap of default probability distributions
across investment grade ratings; many ￿rms with investment grade ratings have the same or
very similar default probabilities even though their ratings are quite di⁄erent. This means that
variation in rating explains only very little variation in raw default probability. Furthermore,
there is important time-variation in failure probabilities not captured by ratings.
Our results in the ￿rst part of the paper suggest that if ratings are understood primarily
as predictors of default, then they are puzzling for a number of reasons. First, they are easily
improved upon using publicly available data. Second, they fail to di⁄erentiate between ￿rms:
￿rms with the same rating often have widely di⁄erent default probabilities and ￿rms with
very di⁄erent ratings often have very similar default probabilities. Third, they fail to capture
variation in default probability over time.
In the second part of the paper, we investigate if instead credit ratings capture systematic
default risk. We begin by identifying a measure of systematic risk. We assume a single
factor structure for default probability and measure a ￿rm￿ s systematic risk by its ￿ failure
beta￿ , the sensitivity of its default probability to the common factor. We ￿nd that median
default probability is highly correlated with the ￿rst principal component (which explains the
majority of the variation in default probability across ratings) and therefore use median default
probability as our measure of the common factor.
3For risk averse investors to be concerned about failure beta it must be the case that a bond￿ s
failure beta a⁄ects the non-diversi￿able component of its risk. It is straightforward to show that
failure betas are monotonically related to joint default probability for any pair of ￿rms, so that
higher failure beta is equivalent to higher non-diversi￿able default risk. Furthermore, times of
high default probabilities (high levels of the common factor) are bad times: the realized default
rate varies countercyclically, being much higher during and immediately after recessions and
￿nancial crises (e.g. Campbell et al. (2008), Du¢ e et al. (2009)).5 Risk averse investors will
demand a higher risk premium as compensation for higher exposure to bad times.
We ￿nd that credit rating strongly re￿ ects variation in systematic risk and that exposure
to bad times is compensated by higher CDS risk premia. We estimate failure betas for each
rating and ￿nd that failure beta is strongly related to rating: there is in fact a monotonic
relationship between rating and failure beta, and failure beta explains 95% of variation in
rating. The increase in default probability during recessions and ￿nancial crises (￿ bad times￿ )
is more pronounced for lower rated (high failure beta) ￿rms. Investors demand compensation
for the exposure to this risk ￿we ￿nd that variation in failure beta explains 93% of the variation
in CDS risk premia across ratings.
The relationship between credit rating (and CDS risk premia) and systematic risk is robust
to using more conventional measures of systematic risk such as CAPM beta and down beta, the
sensitivity of stock returns to negative market returns. The relationship is stronger for down
beta and strongest for failure beta, suggesting that credit ratings are measuring exposure to
bad times, something corporate bond investors are particularly concerned about.
Finally, we present evidence that long run ￿rm-speci￿c default probability and systematic
risk are distinct measures of a ￿rm￿ s credit risk. We cannot fully capture a ￿rm￿ s default
risk by its systematic risk: multiplying failure beta by the common component of default
probability is an inferior predictor of default probability, both at short and long horizons,
5The recent recession is no exception: An important consequence of the recent ￿nancial crisis and
recession has been the ongoing wave of major corporate failures and near-failures. In the ￿rst eight
months of 2009 216 corporate issuers defaulted a⁄ecting $523 billion of debt (September 2009 S&P
report). High default rates in recessions may be the result of low fundamentals during these times
(Campbell et al. (2008)), they may be driven by credit cycles (Sharpe (1994), Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Geanakoplos (2009)), or by unobservable factors (Du¢ e et al. (2009)).
4when compared to failure score. Decomposing default probability into a systematic and an
idiosyncratic component, we show that both are needed to forecast default. Furthermore, credit
rating is primarily related to the systematic component of default probability; the idiosyncratic
component does not help explain variation in rating.
In summary our results suggest that, in the case of corporate credit risk, credit ratings
are at least as informative about systematic risk of default, or bond risk premia, as about
probability of default, or expected payo⁄s. Interestingly, rating agencies themselves appear to
be aware of this dual objective: Standard & Poor￿ s website states that a AA rating means that
a bond is, in the agency￿ s opinion, ￿less likely to default than the BBB bond.￿ 6 On the same
web-page, the agency states that a speculative-grade rating ￿factors in greater vulnerability to
down business cycles.￿However, given that credit risk contains at least two dimensions that
investors care about, it follows that a single measure cannot accurately capture all aspects of
credit risk.
Our results can explain a number of otherwise puzzling aspects of ratings: (1) why ratings
are not as good as a simple alternative at forecasting default: to do so does not seem to
be their sole purpose; (2) why ratings do not distinguish well between ￿rms with di⁄erent
default probabilities: default probability and systematic default risk are economically di⁄erent
attributes; (3) why agencies ￿ rate through the cycle￿ : if systematic risk equals ￿vulnerability
to down business cycles,￿(the measurement of which is a stated objective) it cannot vary over
the business cycle, so neither can rating to the extent rating re￿ ects systematic risk; (4) why
risk-averse investors are interested in ratings and why variation in borrowing cost is strongly
related to rating: investors care both about expected payo⁄ and about risk premia.
This paper adds to a large early literature that evaluates the ability of ratings to predict
default, beginning with Hickman (1958). More recently, van Deventer, Li, and Wang (2005)
evaluate Basel II implementations and compare accuracy ratios of S&P credit ratings to a
reduced form measure of default probability. Cantor and Mann (2003), as well as subsequent
quarterly updates of this study, evaluate the ability of Moody￿ s credit ratings to predict bank-
6￿... [A] corporate bond that is rated ￿ AA￿is viewed by the rating agency as having a higher credit
quality than a corporate bond with a ￿ BBB￿rating. But the ￿ AA￿rating isn￿ t a guarantee that it will
not default, only that, in the agency￿ s opinion, it is less likely to default than a ￿ BBB￿bond.￿
5ruptcy relative to various alternatives. Our paper advances this line of work since we provide
a comprehensive comparison of the marginal and cumulative ability of credit ratings and the
most recent reduced form models to predict corporate default, evaluate the ability of default
probabilities to explain variation in CDS spreads and to predict downgrades, measure di⁄er-
ences in default probability within rating and over time, and decompose default probability
into systematic and idiosyncratic components.
Our ￿ndings are also related to several studies that investigate the determinants of corpo-
rate bond prices. The idea that both default probabilities and risk premia a⁄ect bond prices
and CDS spreads is well understood (see e.g. Elton, Gruber, Agarwal, and Mann (2001)).
Equivalently, studies have shown that prices depend on both objective and risk-neutral proba-
bilities (Chen (2009), Bhamra, Kuehn, and Strebulaev (2010)). However, these papers do not
relate their ￿ndings to credit ratings, other than using ratings as a control. In the context
of credit ratings of tranched portfolios secured on pools of underlying ￿xed-income securities,
such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), the distinction between default probability and
systematic risk has been made by Coval, Jurek, and Sta⁄ord (2009) and Brennan, Hein, and
Poon (2009).7 However, both papers assume that ratings relate only to default probability or
expected loss and proceed to show how this can lead to mis-pricing. In our study we propose
an explicit measure of systematic risk and ￿nd that credit ratings contain information not only
about default probability but also about systematic risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section describes our data and failure
prediction methodology; section 3 presents our main results on credit rating and default prob-
ability and then investigates further the information in credit ratings and failure score relevant
to default; section 4 relates ratings to systematic default risk; the last section concludes.
7Our study does not examine credit ratings of complex securities. Instead it focuses in the accuracy
of credit ratings in what is arguably the agencies￿core competence: assessing corporate credit risk.
62 Measuring corporate default probability
In the ￿rst part of the paper we explore the information about raw default probability in
corporate credit ratings. To do this we perform two empirical exercises. We ￿rst propose a
direct measure of raw default probability, an empirical measure based on publicly available
accounting and market-based information. We examine the ability both of our measure and of
ratings to forecast default. We then analyze further the relationship between our measure of
default probability and ratings.
We begin by introducing and discussing our measure of default probability. Our method for
predicting default follows Campbell et al. (2008) and builds on the earlier work of Shumway
(2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004). Speci￿cally, we use the same failure indicator and ex-
planatory variables as Campbell et al. All of the variables, the speci￿cation, and the estimation
procedure (described in more detail in section 2.2) are discussed in Campbell et al., who also
show that this speci￿cation outperforms other standard methods of default prediction. The
model is more accurate than Shumway and Chava and Jarrow, who use a smaller set of ex-
planatory variables, and is also more accurate than using distance-to-default, a measure based
on the Merton (1974) model (e.g. Vassalou and Xing (2004)).8
2.1 Corporate failures and explanatory variables
Our failure indicator includes bankruptcy ￿ling (chapter 7 or chapter 11), de-listing for performance-
related reasons, D (default) or SD (selective default) rating, and government-led bailout. The
data was provided to us by Kamakura Risk Information Services (KRIS) and covers the period
1963 to 2008.
Table 1 panel A reports the number of ￿rms and failure events in our data set. The
second column counts the number of active ￿rms, which we de￿ne to be those ￿rms with some
available accounting or equity market data. We report the number of failures over time and
the percentage of active ￿rms that failed each year (failure rate) in columns 3 and 4. We
8Bharath and Shumway (2008) also document that a simple hazard model performs better than
distance-to-default.
7repeat this information for those ￿rms with an S&P credit rating in columns 5 through 7.
Since our data on credit ratings begin in 1986 we mainly focus on reporting statistics for the
period from 1986 to 2008. The universe of rated ￿rms is much smaller; only 18% of active
￿rms are rated on average. However, rated ￿rms tend to be much larger which means that
the average share of liabilities that is rated is equal to 76%.
The failure rate exhibits strong variation over time. This variation is at least partly related
to recessions and ￿nancial crises (table 1 panel B). The average failure rate during and in the
12 months after NBER recessions is equal to 1.4%. In the 12 months after the October 1987
stock market crash and the September 1998 Russian and LTCM crisis the failure rate is equal
to 2%. Both of these are higher than the 0.8% failure rate outside of recessions and crises.
The pattern for rated ￿rms is very similar. The failure rate for rated ￿rms is almost three
times higher during and immediately after recessions (2.4%) and crises (2.3%) than it is outside
of these times (0.9%).
To our history of failure events we add measures of ￿nancial distress. We construct ex-
planatory variables using accounting and equity market data from daily and monthly CRSP
￿les and quarterly data from Compustat. The explanatory variables we use measure prof-
itability, leverage, past returns, volatility of past returns, ￿rm size, ￿rm cash holdings, and
￿rm valuation. Speci￿cally, we include the following variables in our failure prediction model:
NIMTAAV G, a weighted average of past quarterly ratios of net income to market value of
total assets; TLMTA, the ratio of book value of total liabilities to market value of total assets;
EXRETAV G, a weighted average of past monthly log returns relative to the S&P 500 value-
weighted return; RSIZE, the log ratio of a ￿rm￿ s market capitalization to that of the S&P
500 index; SIGMA, the standard deviation of the ￿rm￿ s daily stock return over the previous
3 months; PRICE, the ￿rm￿ s log price per share, truncated above at a price of $15 per share;
CASHMTA, the ratio of cash to market value of total assets and MB, the market-to-book
ratio of the ￿rm. Together, these variables, and a constant, make up the vector xit, which we
use to predict failure at di⁄erent horizons.
82.2 Predicting failure in a logit model
We assume the month-t marginal probability of failure in month t + s follows a logistic distri-
bution. We allow the coe¢ cients, the relative weights of the di⁄erent predictor variables, to
depend on the horizon over which we are predicting failure. The conditional probability of
failure is given by:
Pt(Yi;t+s = 1jxit) = (1 + exp(￿￿0
sxit))￿1 (1)
where Yi;t+s is an indicator variable that equals one if ￿rm i fails in month t+s conditional on
not failing earlier, xit is a vector of our explanatory variables, including a constant, observed
at the end of month t, and ￿0
sxit is a linear combination of these explanatory variables. We
estimate the vector ^ ￿ and refer to the linear combination ^ ￿
0
sxit as the ￿ failure score￿of ￿rm i in
month t. Failure score and failure probability are then (positively) related by equation (1).9
Table 2 reports results from estimating a logit model using data from 1963 to 2008. We
predict failure over the next month (column (1)) and in 12 months (column (2)). The explana-
tory variables are related to failure as we would expect. Firms are more likely to fail if they
are less pro￿table, have higher leverage, lower and more volatile past returns, and lower cash
holdings. The market-to-book ratio enters with a positive sign. Firms with lower price per
share are more likely to fail and size enters with a counterintuitive positive coe¢ cient, which
is most likely driven by the high correlation of size and price. At the 12-month horizon, the
results are similar, except that size and price are insigni￿cant.
As measures of ￿t we report McFadden￿ s pseudo R2 which is equal to 31.6% and 11.8%
for the 1-month and 12-month models. For comparison, Campbell et al. report a pseudo
R2 of 31.2% for their ￿ best model,￿27% for Shumway￿ s (2001) model, and 15.9% when using
distance-to-default. We also report the accuracy ratio which measures the tendency for the
default predictor to be higher when default actually subsequently occurs (true positive) and
9Assuming independence of default in each month, the probability that a ￿rm defaults between
month t and month t + s is then one minus the probability of survival for s months:
Pt(Zi;t;t+s = 1) = 1 ￿ ￿s
j=1 (1 ￿ Pt(Yi;t+j))
where Zi;t;t+s equals one if ￿rm i defaults between month t and month t + s.
9lower when default subsequently does not occur (true negative). It is a useful non-parametric
measure of model performance and varies from 50% (random model) to 100% (perfect model).
It is a commonly used measure when evaluating a binary response model. For the 1-month
and 12-month models reported in table 2 the accuracy ratios are equal to 95.5% and 86.2%.
3 Information about default probability in credit
rating
Having constructed our measure of raw default probability we can now compare our failure
score with S&P long-term general corporate credit rating as a predictor of default. Data on
monthly S&P credit ratings are from Compustat.10 To investigate the relative performance
of credit rating and failure score, we add rating as an additional explanatory variable in our
hazard model. For our ￿rst set of results we estimate:






We restrict the coe¢ cients ￿0
s to equal their estimates obtained when including data for all
listed ￿rms, as opposed to only those that are rated. This means that the coe¢ cient vector
￿1 contains the coe¢ cients reported in table 1, column 1. For longer horizons we use the
equivalent longer-range estimates. In other words, we estimate a failure score for all listed
￿rms and then estimate how much additional information is contained in rating regarding the
failure prospects of rated ￿rms. This sets the bar for failure score a little higher than just
estimating an unrestricted regression with rating as an additional ￿rm characteristic.11
S&P credit ratings for ￿rms that are not in default run from AAA to C. Ratings from AA
10S&P also supply short-term ratings, but these cover a much smaller sample of issuers. We have
checked that our results on prediction accuracy are robust to the inclusion of short-term credit ratings.
As we discuss in Section 3.1.3, our results also are robust to using Moody￿ s instead of S&P ratings. In
addition to ratings provided by rating agencies, banks often develop internal ratings. Carey and Hrycay
(2004) and Krahnen and Weber (2001) discuss that rating process.
11If we instead estimate the unrestricted regression, failure score performs better, and outperforms
rating by more at all horizons.
10to CCC are further divided into 3 subgroups each with a ￿ +￿or a ￿ ￿ ￿added to the rating (e.g.
A+, A, A￿ ). We assign a score of 1 to AAA and each reduction in rating receives an additional
score of 1 so that BBB (the lowest investment grade rating) is assigned a score of 9 and C
(one notch above default) receives a score of 21. Thus our ratings variable, like failure score,
is positively related to default risk. The assumption of linearity does not a⁄ect our results of
relative forecast accuracy; we discuss robustness checks in more detail in section 3.1.3.
3.1 Relative forecast accuracy of credit rating and failure score
3.1.1 Marginal forecast accuracy
Table 3 reports the results from our estimation of the baseline model in equation (2). Panel A
reports pseudo R2 and accuracy ratios. We report results for speci￿cations with only failure
score, only rating, and both failure score and rating. We focus speci￿cally on the ability of
di⁄erent measures to forecast failure at di⁄erent horizons and consider 1, 3, 6, and 12-month
horizons, as well as 2, 3, 4, and 5-year horizons. We are estimating the probability of default
at these horizons conditional on no previous default. This means that we are intuitively
estimating forecast accuracies of marginal default probabilities at di⁄erent points in time. We
consider cumulative forecast accuracies in section 3.1.2.
Failure score predicts default at horizons of one month with a pseudo R2 of 40% versus 29.2%
for rating alone, which means that failure score outperforms rating by 10.8 points. Adding
rating to failure score increases the pseudo R2 from 40% to 42.4%. Thus, rating appears to
contain little additional information about the probability of failure in the immediate future,
while failure score signi￿cantly outperforms rating.
Figure 1 plots the pseudo R2 for all horizons from our baseline model for failure score
only, rating only, and both together. Since we expect a large increase in uncertainty at longer
horizons we expect marginal forecast accuracies to diminish with the forecast horizon. This
is indeed what we ￿nd; the ability of either failure score, rating, or both to forecast failure
declines monotonically with the forecast horizon. Using both measures, the pseudo R2 declines
from 42.4% at the 1-month horizon to 5.6% at the 60-month horizon. Failure score continues
11to outperform rating in the medium term, at horizons of 3, 6, 12, and 24 months. Failure score
outperforms rating by 14.2 and 12.1 points at the 3 and 6 months horizons and by 7.8 and
0.7 points at the 12 and 24 months horizons. At 36 months both measures have close to the
same forecast accuracy and for the 4 and 5-year horizons rating only is a slightly more accurate
predictor than failure score only (we discuss shortly that this small advantage cannot make
up for the lower accuracy of rating at short horizons). Nevertheless, using both measures is
always better in terms of accuracy than using only one of the measures. Table 3 also reports
accuracy ratios and we ￿nd that using them results in the same pattern across the di⁄erent
prediction horizons as the pseudo R2.
Table 3 panel B reports the coe¢ cient estimates and their associated z-statistics for the
speci￿cations including both failure score and rating. The signi￿cance levels of credit rating
and failure score, when both are included, re￿ ect the relative performance of the individual
measures. The pattern in z-statistics re￿ ects the pattern in pseudo R2 ￿both are statistically
signi￿cant at all horizons, but failure score is much more signi￿cant up to about 2 years,
signi￿cance levels are similar at 3 years, and rating is more signi￿cant at 4 and 5 years.
The signi￿cance levels of the coe¢ cients also re￿ ect the incremental information of the two
measures. This means that the additional information contained in failure score and rating is
statistically signi￿cant at all horizons.
3.1.2 Cumulative forecast accuracy
We also consider the ability of ratings and failure score to predict cumulative failure prob-
abilities at longer horizons. We expect that the slightly superior performance of rating at
predicting the marginal probability of failure at horizons of more than 3 years, conditional on
no earlier failure, is not enough to make up for the much greater predictive power of failure
score at shorter horizons. The area under each line in ￿gure 1 can be thought of as an estimate
of the ability to forecast default over time (cumulative probability), rather than at some future
point (marginal probability). The area under the ￿ both￿line is only slightly greater than under
the line for failure score alone, while it is clearly substantially larger than the area under the
line for rating alone.
12To consider the relative accuracy more formally each January we construct cumulative
failure events for the following 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 years. We then use rating and 12-month
failure score as predictors of default. Panel C of table 3 reports the pseudo R2 measures which
decline monotonically with the horizon but are always higher for failure score only than for
rating only. At horizons of one year, failure score￿ s forecast accuracy is 41.4% compared
to 24.1% for rating. Adding rating to failure score increases the pseudo R2 from 41.4% to
42.7%. At 5-year horizons, failure score predicts correctly cumulative failure events 23.2% of
the time versus 18.0% for rating only, and failure score outperforms rating at all intervening
horizons. Adding rating to failure score increases the pseudo R2 from 23.2% to 26.7% at
5-year horizons.12
At long horizons failure score still dominates credit rating as a default predictor: the pseudo-
R2s are respectively 20.6% versus 16.5% at 7 years and 18.9% versus 14.8% at 10 years, although
credit ratings are still useful additional default predictors even at long horizons. Thus failure
score is a better predictor of long-run cumulative default predictability than credit rating, even
at a horizon of 10 years.
It may not be too surprising that failure score is a good forecast of default at short and
medium horizons: most investors should presumably be aware of impending disaster at such
short horizons and equity market data, such as past returns and volatility, will likely re￿ ect
this awareness. Yet all the information available to the market is also available to the rating
agencies,13 which means that by ignoring or not responding to publicly available early warning
signals of default at horizons of up to 3 years, ratings fail as an optimal forecast of default.
However, what may be more surprising is that credit ratings are not optimal forecasts of default
even at 10-year horizons. We conclude that, whatever else ratings may measure, they are not
optimal forecasts of default.
12The (unreported) pattern in accuracy ratios is similar.
13In fact, it may be that rating agencies have additional information, that is not available to the
public (see, for example, Jorion, Liu, and Shi (2005)). If they do have such information, and if this
information is re￿ ected in the rating, it does not seem to make up for their seemingly slow response to
market data.
133.1.3 Robustness of relative forecast accuracy
We now investigate the robustness of our conclusions to a range of other possibilities in inves-
tigating relative forecast accuracy. We brie￿ y discuss the reason for each robustness test as
well as the results of performing it.14
First, we check if our results are driven by look-ahead bias and consider the ability of the
model to predict failure out-of-sample. Since we estimate failure score using data from 1963
to 2008 and compare rating and failure score from 1986 to 2008, there is a large overlap in
the sample period. We perform two checks: First, we estimate coe¢ cients on failure score
from 1963 to 2003 (the same period as in Campbell et al.) and then test relative out-of-
sample performance using data on failure events from 2004 to 2008. In doing so the data
used to construct the independent variable (the estimate of the coe¢ cients for the vector ￿s)
and the data used for the dependent variable (the failure indicator) do not overlap. Thus
this is a genuine out-of-sample test (as opposed to a pseudo out-of-sample test) of the ability
of the model to predict corporate failure, given the earlier results in Campbell et al. We
￿nd that the relative di⁄erence between failure score and rating is larger during the 2004-2008
period than for the full sample used in table 3. Next, we compare failure score, estimated
recursively, to credit rating. We re-estimate the model each year from 1986 to 2007, updating
the estimates of ￿s, and use those coe¢ cients to predict failure during the following year. We
then compare forecast accuracy of failure score only and rating only. Our results are not
signi￿cantly a⁄ected by this alternative procedure. We conclude that failure score is a superior
predictor of corporate failure both in and out-of-sample.
Second, the superior performance of failure score could be due to the discrete nature of
credit rating, and our comparing it, perhaps unfairly, to a continuous failure score. To
address this possibility we discretize our failure score measure and compare its performance
with rating using the same procedure as we used for the continuous version. We choose our
discretization so that the size of a group with a common (discrete) failure score accounts for
the same proportion of the rated sample as the group with a common rating. For example, the
14Results from the various tests are available upon request.
14number of observations of ￿rms rated AAA corresponds to the size of the group with the lowest
failure score. We then assign scores of 1 to 21 to these groups. We ￿nd that the discretized
failure score predicts default at a similar level of accuracy as continuous failure score which
means that it performs as well relative to ratings.
Third, one might be concerned that our results are driven by the inability of ratings to
capture variation in aggregate default rates. From the results in table 1 we know that there
are signi￿cant di⁄erences in the failure rate over time. However, there is no corresponding
change in ratings, given that ratings ￿ rate through the cycle￿(Amato and Fur￿ne (2004), L￿› er
(2004a)). It is possible, therefore, that the forecast accuracy of ratings would improve if we
were to allow predicted average default rates to vary over time. We investigate this hypothesis
in three ways: (a) we include separate dummy variables for recessions and ￿nancial crises and
compare relative performance. (b) We include median failure score together with rating. If
failure score re￿ ects time variation but ratings do not, adding median failure score to rating
should reduce this disadvantage. (c) We include time dummies together with ratings and failure
score. Since there are several years with only very few events, we include two-year dummies for
estimation purposes. We ￿nd that none of these alternative speci￿cations signi￿cantly a⁄ects
the results in table 3.
Fourth, another concern could be that our results are driven by not accounting for possible
non-linearities in the relationship between rating and observed failures. We include rating
linearly in the logit model and using a di⁄erent functional form may lead to an increase in
forecast accuracy. Although such a change may increase the pseudo R2, it will not a⁄ect
the accuracy ratio of the predictor since any monotonic transformation of rating will lead to
the same classi￿cation of predicted failures and therefore have the same accuracy ratio. To
investigate whether or not the pseudo R2 is a⁄ected we include rating dummies instead of
rating score. We group ￿rms into 10 groups by rating and estimate a logit model allowing
the coe¢ cient on the dummy variables to vary freely.15 Again, we ￿nd that failure score
15From an estimation point of view it is not possible to include a di⁄erent dummy variable for each
rating. Some ratings have very low frequencies of failures, and some have no observed events. It is
therefore necessary to group observations together. Grouping ratings also helps with the possibility
that the relationship between rating and failure may not be monotonic. For example, it may be that
15outperforms rating by a substantial margin in predicting default.
Fifth, it is possible that ratings do a poor job at predicting failure because a typical rat-
ing is stale, but that ratings changes or ratings that have recently changed are much better
at predicting default.16 We address this concern in two ways: (a) We add the interaction
of rating change and rating to our standard speci￿cation. If ratings that recently changed
contain more information this change should lead to an increase in forecast accuracy. (b)
We include a downgrade indicator as an additional variable. Downgrades may contain impor-
tant information about the possibility of future default and allowing for an additional e⁄ect
may increase accuracy. This check also addresses the concern that ratings changes are asym-
metrically informative and that only downgrades really matter. Neither change to our main
speci￿cation a⁄ects our results materially. We also include outlook (negative, positive) and
watch (downgrade, upgrade) as additional variables and ￿nd that our results are unchanged.
We perform this check using Moody￿ s data, since S&P outlook and watch data are not available
in COMPUSTAT.
Finally, we run all the tests (not just those in the preceding section) using Moody￿ s ratings
instead of S&P ratings. Our ￿ndings about the relative strength of failure score grow slightly
￿rmer if we use Moody￿ s instead, and none of our other ￿ndings are materially altered. For
brevity, we include only our results using S&P ratings. Our results using Moody￿ s ratings are
available on request.
We conclude that our results are robust to look-ahead bias and out-of-sample evaluation,
discretization, time e⁄ects, non-linearities, vintage e⁄ects, asymmetries in the e⁄ect of rating,
and choice of rating agency.
3.2 The relationship between default probability and rating
The fact that a simple model, combining accounting and market-based variables, dominates
ratings as a default predictor provides evidence that ratings are not primarily an optimal
in the data B- rated ￿rms are more likely to default than CCC+ rated ￿rms.
16Such an interpretation would be consistent with Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) who doc-
ument bond price e⁄ects in response to rating changes, implying that such changes are viewed as news.
16estimate of raw default probability. We now explore this hypothesis further by analyzing
the extent to which rating re￿ ects information related to default probability. We ￿rst provide
additional evidence that the ￿tted values of our model may be regarded as benchmark estimates
of default probability and then present evidence on how ratings relate to these estimates.
3.2.1 Further motivation for failure score as a benchmark measure of default
probability
If variation in default probability is viewed by market participants as being informative it
should be re￿ ected in market prices.17 To check this we consider the ability of our estimates
of default probability to explain variation in credit default swap (CDS) spreads. CDS spreads
can be thought of as the spread over a default-free bond of equivalent maturity that a given
issuer must pay. Intuitively, the spread should re￿ ect both compensation for a high default
probability (expected loss) as well as the asset￿ s risk premium. At this point we consider only
if variation in spreads across issuers and over time can be attributed to raw default probability.
We return to the e⁄ect of systematic risk in section 4. We use monthly 5-year CDS spreads
from 2001 to 2007, obtained from Markit Partners. Our sample consists of all rated ￿rms
for which we are able to construct a failure probability resulting in a sample of over 38,000
￿rm-months.
Table 4 panel A presents results of regressions of log spreads on log 12-month failure prob-
ability.18 We assume a linear relationship19 and include rating ￿xed e⁄ects (columns (1) and
(2)), rating and year ￿xed e⁄ects (columns (3) and (4)), and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (columns (5) and
(6)). For each set of ￿xed e⁄ects we then run a regression with and without failure probabil-
ity. In all speci￿cations failure probability is a highly economically and statistically signi￿cant
17The idea that default probability is related to yield spreads on risky debt was suggested as early
as Fisher (1959). Speci￿cally, Fisher motivates his approach by an earlier quote that ￿No person of
sound mind would lend on the personal security of an individual of doubtful character and solvency.￿
More recently, Huang and Huang (2003) and Du¢ e et al. (2008) have explored this idea.
18Standard errors are clustered by year to take into account the possibility of cross-sectional
correlation.
19The assumption of linearity is consistent with an earlier study by Berndt, Douglas, Du¢ e, Ferguson,
and Schranz (2008). In addition, in unreported results, we ￿nd strong evidence for a linear relationship,
with coe¢ cients stable when running regressions separately for di⁄erent rating groups.
17determinant of CDS spreads. A 1% increase in failure probability is associated with a 0.44%
to 0.71% increase in spreads. Failure probability explains 30% of within rating variation and
30.5% of within ￿rm variation in CDS spreads. The information in failure probability is also
re￿ ected in overall R2: adding failure probability to a model containing only rating ￿xed ef-
fects results in an increase of overall R2 from 64.5% to 75.2%; adding failure probability to
rating and year ￿xed e⁄ects increases overall R2 from 77.7% to 82.6%.20 We conclude that our
estimates of default probability contain important information re￿ ected in market prices.
We also present evidence that failure probabilities predict downgrades. In panel B of table 4
we estimate logit regressions of an indicator variable that is equal to one if a ￿rm is downgraded
during the next month and use failure score as our explanatory variable. We control for rating
e⁄ects (columns (1) and (2)) and rating and year e⁄ects (columns (3) and (4)). For each set
of dummies we estimate models with and without failure score. We ￿nd that the coe¢ cient on
failure score is highly statistically signi￿cant and that failure score adds substantial explanatory
power. When including failure score together with rating dummies the pseudo-R2 increases
from 1.3% to 10.6%; when adding failure score to rating and year dummies the pseudo-R2
increases from 2.4% to 11.4%. The accuracy ratios re￿ ect the same pattern: including failure
score increases the accuracy ratios by 17.3 and 13.7 points respectively.
The evidence in table 4 indicates that variation in our estimates of default probability are
re￿ ected in market prices and contain information about ratings downgrades. In addition,
tables 2 and 3 show that our estimates of default probability predict default well and better
than ratings at horizons of up to ten years. We conclude that failure score is an accurate
measure of raw default probability.
3.2.2 How credit ratings relate to failure probabilities
We now treat our estimates of default probability as observations of actual raw default prob-
ability and continue to explore the information in rating relevant for predicting default.
20These results are consistent with Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987), who ￿nd that accounting
measures such as coverage and leverage contain information about spreads on industrial bonds that are
not re￿ ected by rating.
18Ratings do not clearly separate ￿rms by default probability, though the rank-
ing of average default probabilities is correct. If rating measures raw default prob-
ability then variation in rating should explain variation in default probability. To explore the
information about default probability in rating we therefore compare ￿tted failure probabilities
across credit ratings. Figure 2 presents box plots of failure probability by rating. Each box
plot is a vertical line showing the 10th percentile, median, and 90th percentiles as horizontal
bars, with the interquartile range as a grey box. The highest-rated ￿rms are closest to the
origin and have the lowest failure probabilities. Speci￿cally, we plot the base-ten logarithm of
the annualized 12-month failure probability for ￿rm-months with a given rating. To facilitate
comparison across time, we subtract from every failure probability the annual median across all
rated ￿rms. This way the variation in default probability by rating is not driven by common
variation in default probability over time, which we discuss shortly.
Three obvious inferences can be made from ￿gure 2. First, the ranking of distributions by
rating is broadly correct: all points of the distribution, more or less, increase monotonically
as rating declines from AAA to CC. Second, there is considerable overlap across ratings. For
example, the 75th percentile default probability for any rating is always higher than the median
for the next lower rating, or even for that two notches lower. Third, the overlap in distributions
is much more obvious for investment grade issuers: there appears to be almost total overlap for
issuers rated between AA and BBB-. There is so much overlap that for some adjacent ratings
or even ratings two notches apart, we are unable to reject the hypothesis that their mean
default probabilities are the same. In fact, the 75th percentile AA-rated issuer (two notches
below AAA) is more likely to default than the median issuer rated BBB-, the last rating before
reaching junk status. Therefore, the decline in distribution is mainly for non-investment grade
issuers.
It appears that, especially for investment grade issuers, credit ratings are not strongly
related to raw default probability. In a regression of log default probability on rating, rating
explains only 20% of the variation in default probability for non-investment grade issuers. For
investment grade issuers, the relationship is even weaker: Credit rating only explains 3% of the
variation in default probability. The large within-rating dispersion and the inability of rating to
19explain variation in default probability suggest that ratings do not clearly separate ￿rms into
categories by default probability. We note that, as we have previously shown, within-rating
dispersion in default probability is re￿ ected in CDS spreads and therefore does not represent
only noise.
For a given rating, a ￿rm￿ s default probability varies over time. We now turn
our attention to examining variation in default probability by rating over time. We know
that average default rates are higher during recessions and ￿nancial crises (table 1); however,
ratings do not appear to capture this variation in default probability over the business cycle.
Figure 3 plots median annualized 12-month failure probabilities over time for the 5 rating
categories AA, A, BBB, BB, and B (the 5 letter ratings with the most available observations).
Although the ranking of median failure probability by rating is largely preserved over time,
the probability of failure of a typical ￿rm in a given rating class rises dramatically in recessions
and ￿nancial crises. In addition to the overall increase in default probability during bad times,
di⁄erences across ratings become larger.21 If rating corresponded to raw default probability,
the lines in ￿gure 3 would be roughly ￿ at and parallel.22
The strong variation in default probabilities over time may be related to the rating agencies￿
stated practice to ￿ rate through the cycle￿(Amato and Fur￿ne (2004), L￿› er (2004a)). This
practice implies that ratings may do a poor job measuring time variation in default probability
but leaves open the question of how large this underlying variation actually is. Figure 3 quan-
ti￿es the inability of rating to re￿ ect ￿ uctuations in raw default probability and demonstrates
that this variation is substantial.
We also con￿rm that, consistent with the practice of ￿ rating through the cycle,￿the share
of ￿rms in a particular rating group does not vary directly with business conditions. Figure 4
plots the share of ￿rms rated AA, A, BBB, BB, and B. Although there is a clear decline over
time in the share of ￿rms rated AA and A (also see Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998)), there
21We explore this pattern further in section 4 when we relate rating to measures of systematic risk.
22Our results relate to several previous studies that also ￿nd that default probabilities vary counter-
cyclically. See e.g. Fons (1991), Blume and Keim (1991), Jonsson and Fridson (1996), McDonald and
Van de Gucht (1999), Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt (2004), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and
Vassalou and Xing (2004).
20is no clear tendency of the share of lower-rated issuers to increase during and after recessions
and ￿nancial crises.23
The results in this section present evidence that failure score, a simple linear combination of
variables based on publicly available accounting magnitudes and equity prices, is a signi￿cantly
better predictor of corporate default and failure than credit rating at horizons of up to ten
years. Estimated default probabilities are strongly related to CDS spreads and also predict
downgrades. Treating ￿tted failure probabilities as measures of actual raw default probabilities
we ￿nd that although ratings rank ￿rms correctly in terms of broad averages, they do not
clearly separate ￿rms by default probability. Furthermore, for a given rating, there is a strong
tendency for default probabilities to vary over time, especially increasing in bad times. All
of these results indicate that ratings, contrary to what is often assumed, are not primarily or
exclusively a measure of ￿rm-speci￿c raw default probability.
4 Systematic risk and credit rating
We now ask if ratings instead measure systematic risk. When determining market prices a
bondholder cares not only about default probability (expected payo⁄) but also about system-
atic risk (discount rate). In fact, S&P￿ s website suggests that its rating re￿ ects both things:
AA is described as having a ￿very strong capacity to meet ￿nancial commitments￿while BBB
is described as having ￿[a]dequate capacity to meet ￿nancial commitments, but more subject
to adverse economic conditions.￿
Figure 3 showed a strong tendency for median default probabilities of di⁄erent ratings to
spread out in recessions and crises so that the default probability of lower-rated ￿rms increases
by more during bad times. This suggests that rating re￿ ects sensitivity of credit risk to
bad times and, therefore, that rating may at least partly capture systematic risk of default.
We now consider this hypothesis directly. In the next subsection, we introduce our measure
of a ￿rm￿ s systematic default risk: failure beta. We then present evidence that ratings
23We note that the lack of a strong association of rating share and business conditions is also consistent
with the inability of year dummies to explain variation in the downgrade rate in table 4.
21separate ￿rms by failure beta and that failure beta is priced in the cross-section of CDS risk
premia. Finally, we check that our claim that ratings capture systematic risk is robust to using
alternative measures of systematic risk and show that systematic risk and default probability
are economically di⁄erent attributes.
4.1 Measuring systematic default risk: failure beta
We now identify a measure of systematic default risk, the extent to which a ￿rm￿ s default
risk is exposed to common and therefore undiversi￿able variation in default probability. To
do this we must ￿rst construct a measure of such common variation. We assume that default
probabilities have a single common factor, and estimate this common factor using principal
component analysis. Extracting principal components in the standard way from the full panel
of rated ￿rms is problematic because the cross-section is much larger than the time series. We
therefore ￿rst shrink the size of the cross-section by assigning each ￿rm-month to a given rating-
month and calculating equal-weighted average 12-month cumulative default probabilities (as
used in ￿gure 3). We perform the same exercise grouping the ￿rms by industry instead of by
rating. This leaves us with two panels: the ratings panel consists of 18 ratings groups with
276 months of data; the industry panel consists of 29 Fama-French industries (30 industries
excluding coal, for which we have insu¢ cient data) again with 276 months. For each panel
we extract principal components in the standard way.
We ￿nd clear evidence of common variation in default probabilities. For the ratings panel,
we ￿nd that the ￿rst principal component explains 70.3% of variation in default probability,
while the second principal component explains 9.5% and the third 5.8%. For the industry
panel, the corresponding ￿gures are 41.7%, 10.8% and 7.5%. In addition, both ￿rst principal
components are capturing very similar variation: the correlation between the two is 0.954.
Our assumption of a single factor is therefore a good approximation of the factor structure of
default probabilities, however grouped. We also ￿nd that the ￿rst principal component is a
measure of economy-wide variation in default probability: Both ￿rst principal components are
close to equally-weighted across ratings and industry groups.
In order to gain more insight about the common component of default probability ￿gure
225 plots the ￿rst principal component of the rating panel, the median default probability for
the full panel of rated ￿rms, as well as the mean default probability, weighted by book value
of liabilities. The ￿rst principal component and the median default probability move closely
together and have a correlation of 0.945.24 We therefore use median default probability as our
measure of the common component of default probability.
For the presence of a common factor to be relevant for asset prices it must be related to
the stochastic discount factor. Median default probability is a good measure of bad times: it is
noticeably higher during and immediately after recessions and ￿nancial crises, when economic
theory suggests the stochastic discount factor is high (thin vertical lines show when ￿nancial
crises occur, and grey bars show NBER recessions). The ￿gure also plots the realized failure
rate over the following 12 months for each January and re￿ ects the correlation of 0.64 be-
tween median failure probability and failure rate.25 We conclude that a diversi￿ed, risk-averse
investor will care about exposure to variation in median default probability.
Having identi￿ed the common factor and having interpreted it as correlated with the sto-
chastic discount factor, we can estimate factor exposures: the sensitivity of a ￿rm￿ s default
probability to the common factor. Speci￿cally, for ￿rm i, with cumulative failure probability
Pit, and with credit rating CR we estimate:
Pit = ￿CR + ￿CRPmedian
t + "it: (3)
Pit is the 12-month annualized default probability and Pmedian
t is its median across ￿rms.26 We
use the 12-month measure since it will not be focused excessively on short-term determinants
24The correlation of the ￿rst principal component and the value-weighted mean default probability
is 0.85. For the industry panel the correlation with the median is 0.913 and 0.811 for the mean. The
￿rst di⁄erences are also highly correlated for both measures.
25The one exception to this relationship is the spike in failure rates in 2001, after the end of the
technology bull market of the late 1990s, which is not associated with a large increase in default
probabilities. The reason is visible in ￿gure 3: most of the sharp increase in failures were accounted for
by B-grade issuers (junk), whose median default probability did increase in advance. However, these
issuers were not close to the overall median issuer and did not account for a large proportion of total
rated corporate issuance.
26Or equivalently its ￿rst principal component. Our results are very similar if either the ratings or
industry panel principal component is used instead.
23of failure. In addition, the 12-month measure is an important determinant of within-rating
spread variation in the CDS market (table 4). To avoid worries of non-stationarity in default
probability levels we estimate our regressions using changes in default probabilities rather
than levels, although our results are robust to using default probability levels instead. This
speci￿cation constrains all ￿rms with the same rating to have the same failure beta, and the
resulting estimate is the average ￿rm failure beta, equal-weighted across all ￿rm-months in the
panel. Like stock market beta, failure beta must be estimated and such estimates are subject
to error. Pooling the regression by rating, therefore, has the additional bene￿t of reducing
measurement error of beta.27 In order to ensure a su¢ cient number of observations for each
rating, we combine all observations rated CCC and below together.28
The speci￿cation of (3) does not of itself constrain the dependent variable to lie between zero
and one. However, investigation of the volatility of the residuals reveals a strong linear rela-
tionship with the square root of default probability.29 Since almost all of our estimated default
probabilities are small (so that P(1￿P) ￿ P), this is consistent, for example, with a continu-
ous time model of default probability and its common component in which the innovations are
proportional to (Pt(1 ￿ Pt))
1
2. Such a formulation does constrain default probability, under
suitable initial conditions, to lie between zero and one. In addition, under this speci￿cation,
OLS estimates of ￿CR will be unbiased and consistent, since the ￿rst principal component is
by construction orthogonal to the remaining residual variation. This means that we need only
be concerned about heteroskedastic errors. We therefore use White standard errors to allow
for heteroskedasticity of unknown form. We also cluster by date, to correct for cross-sectional
correlation of the residuals.
27To control for outliers for each rating group we winsorize default probabilities at the 0.5% and
99.5% levels; to control for ￿rm-speci￿c variation in default probability we include ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects.
28As a robustness check, we also estimate failure betas ￿rm-by-￿rm, sort into groups by failure beta,
re-estimate the failure betas for each group, and compare with the mean rating for that group. Our
results are not materially di⁄erent if we use this alternative method, so we conclude that grouping the
data by rating is not what drives our results.
29Results are available from the authors on request.
244.2 Failure beta and credit rating
We estimate failure beta across 18 ratings ranging from AAA to CCC and below. Consistent
with the previous suggestive evidence (￿gure 3) we ￿nd a strong relationship between failure
beta and credit rating. Figure 6 plots estimates of failure beta by rating. The variation in
failure beta is closely related to rating; highly-rated issuers have low failure betas while low-
rated issuers have high failure betas. In fact, failure beta is monotonic in rating and the
correlation between rating score and log failure beta is equal to 0.97. The relationship is
strongly economically and statistically signi￿cant over the whole ratings spectrum and over the
investment grade spectrum alone. We also ￿nd that the relationship is still strongly signi￿cant
when controlling for average default probabilities.
Table 5 reports our estimates of failure beta by rating. As noted, failure beta increases
monotonically with rating from good to poor. The results shown in ￿gure 6 and table 5
establish that ratings are informative about the tendency of an issuer￿ s propensity to default
to worsen in bad times. Ratings, therefore, are measuring at least two distinct forms of credit
risk: default probability and systematic risk.
We note that our results are not at odds with the existing literature on the determinants
of corporate bond spreads: The results in Huang and Huang (2003), Chen (2009), Coval at al.,
(2009), and Bhamra et al. (2010) indicate that a higher share of higher-rated credit spreads
is due to systematic risk (e.g. that the fraction of the spread due to systematic risk is higher
for AAA than it is for junk). Our results imply that even though the share of the spread due
to systematic risk may be higher for higher-rated credit, the absolute level of the systematic
risk is lower. For example, even though AAA bonds are unlikely to default in bad times (they
have low systematic risk), if they ever default the default will almost surely occur in bad times
and so the share of the spread due to systematic risk is high. However, they are very unlikely
to default at any time. By contrast, BB ￿rms are much more likely not to survive bad times
than are AAA ￿rms and so they have higher systematic risk (and higher failure beta). But
BB bonds are also much more likely to default overall so their share of systematic risk may
be lower. Elkamhi and Ericsson (2008) show that such a pattern is consistent with structural
models of corporate bond pricing.
25Our ￿ndings also have wider implications for the literature on credit and default risk. First,
the high sensitivity of low-grade issuers to bad times (as well as the presence of an important
common factor in default probability) establishes that the risk of failure is systematic. This
means that our results contribute to the ongoing discussion of whether or not bankruptcy and
default risk represent systematic risk. Dichev (1998) ￿nds that high bankruptcy and distress
risk is not associated with high equity returns and concludes that high bankruptcy risk is not
a systematic risk.30 In contrast, our results suggest that there is such a thing as systematic
bankruptcy risk. In the next section we demonstrate that systematic default risk is re￿ ected
in asset prices. Speci￿cally, we show that high failure beta is associated with high CDS risk
premia.31
Second, even though systematic default risk is present (and important to a risk-averse
diversi￿ed investor), systematic default risk does not entirely determine default probability.
Table 5 reports the share of the variation in ￿rm-level default probability over time explained
by the common component (within R2s of regressions that include ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects). While
variation in the common component of default probability is clearly signi￿cant, ￿rm-level
default probability also contains an important idiosyncratic component. In fact, consistent
with the substantial variation of default probability within rating (￿gure 2), the share of ￿rm-
level default probability unexplained by the common component tends to vary between 80%
and 95%. We discuss the importance of distinguishing between idiosyncratic and systematic
default probability further in Section 4.5.
4.3 Failure beta and CDS risk premia
In this section we show that variation in failure beta can explain variation in CDS risk premia,
providing supporting evidence that failure beta is related to systematic risk and that investors
30Campbell et al. point out that low equity returns for ￿nancially distressed ￿rms may be the result
of information or arbitrage-related frictions. Consistent with this interpretation, Dichev and Piotroski
(2001) ￿nd that after downgrades low returns occur mainly around earnings announcements which
means that they are probably associated with under-reaction to news instead of low systematic risk.
31Consistent with our ￿nding a close link between CDS risk premia and failure beta (discussed in the
next section), Anginer and Yildizhan (2010) ￿nd that when using credit spreads to proxy for distress
risk such stocks no longer deliver anomalously low returns.
26demand compensation for exposure to it. Economic theory suggests that investors will demand
a higher expected return (and that they will use a higher discount rate) for those ￿rms￿credit
risks that have higher levels of systematic risk. This means that if failure beta is a good
measure of systematic risk, and if variation in systematic risk is priced in the credit market,
we should expect failure beta to be related to CDS risk premia.
We use our measure of default probability and expected recovery rate data from Markit to
calculate a simple measure of CDS risk premia. We consider the price of a discount bond that
defaults with probability Pt. In the case of no default it has a payo⁄ of 1 and in the case of
default its expected payo⁄ equals the expected recovery rate, which we denote as rec. The
expected payo⁄ is discounted at a rate that includes a risk premium RP and the risk-free rate
Rf.32 Today￿ s price then satis￿es:
price =
1 ￿ Pt(1 ￿ rec)
1 + Rf + RP
: (4)
Holding default probability Pt constant, a higher failure beta, which is re￿ ected in a lower
rating, should result in a higher risk premium. Thus our results suggest that ratings do not
exclusively relate to the numerator, the expected payo⁄, but are also important in identifying
the denominator, the expected return. We now evaluate this idea more directly by extracting
risk premia from CDS spreads and relating them to failure beta.
For a pure discount bond spreads are de￿ned as
price =
1
1 + Rf + spread
: (5)
Therefore
RP = (1 + Rf + spread)(1 + Pt(1 ￿ rec)) ￿ (1 + Rf): (6)
Using CDS spreads and recovery rates from Markit,33 together with our estimated failure
32Similar calculations have been used by Elton, Gruber, Agarwal, and Mann (2001), De Jong and
Driessen (2007), Campbello, Chen, and Zhang (2008), and Anginer and Yildizhan (2010).
33We have checked that our results are robust to using alternative measures of expected recovery
rates: following Elton, Gruber, Agarwal, and Mann (2001) we use recovery rates from Altman and
Kishore (1998). We have also used zero recovery rates. Our results are robust to either of these two
27probabilities, we use this relationship to calculate implied risk premia for all issuers in our
CDS sample. We then calculate the median risk premium for each rating-year group for
which we have data.
Figure 7 plots median log risk premia for 5-year CDS contracts from 2001 to 2007 against
log failure betas estimated as above by rating group. Each vertical group of points corresponds
to a rating, for each of which we estimate a separate failure beta. As expected, there is a
strong positive relationship between failure beta and CDS risk premia.
Table 6 quanti￿es the relationship between risk premia and failure beta. We ￿nd a strongly
statistically signi￿cant relationship that is steeper for investment grade issuers. Column (1)
regresses median log risk premia on log failure beta. Log failure beta is statistically signi￿cantly
related to CDS risk premia and explains 82.9% of the variation in risk premia across the 108
rating-years. Column (2) shows that this result is robust to the inclusion of year ￿xed e⁄ects.
Column (3) adds an interaction of log failure beta with an investment grade dummy and shows
that the relationship is signi￿cantly stronger for investment grade ratings.
Column (4) includes log default probability as an additional control. Our calculation of
CDS risk premia (equation (6)) already controls for the level of default probability and so we do
not expect default probability to contain explanatory power.34 Consistent with our intuition
we ￿nd that default probability is not important in explaining variation in risk premia over
and above failure beta and that the relationship between risk premia and failure beta is robust
to this control.
Our conclusion is that our straightforward measure of systematic default risk is strongly
related to credit rating and CDS risk premia. This relationship is robust to controlling for
time e⁄ects and default probabilities. Therefore, ratings appear to measure, at least partly,
the tendency for credit quality to deteriorate in bad times, as well as the raw tendency to
default.
alternatives.
34This is in contrast to the earlier regression in table 4 where we relate CDS spreads (as opposed to
risk premia) to default probabilities.
284.4 Alternative measures of systematic risk
Failure beta is an explicit measure of the tendency of default probability to increase in bad
times. We now consider the robustness of the relationship between credit ratings and sys-
tematic risk to obvious alternative measures of issuer systematic risk. Our objective is ￿rst,
to investigate the robustness of our ￿nding of the relationship between rating and systematic
risk and second, to increase our understanding of the reason why failure beta and CDS risk
premia are related.
The ￿rst measure of systematic risk we consider is CAPM beta. Table 7 presents evidence
on how CAPM beta is related to rating. In panel A we include all ￿rms, while in panel B we
focus on investment grade ￿rms only. As before, our estimates of beta are pooled by rating
group. The left half of the table presents evidence on how credit rating is related to measures
of systematic risk and the right half of the table relates our estimates of CDS risk premia
to these same measures. We ￿nd that CAPM beta is strongly related to rating: variation in
CAPM beta explains 87% of the variation in rating. Even though rating and beta are widely
studied measures of risk, to our knowledge this relationship is not widely appreciated. Yet it
was pointed out in an early study by Schwendiman and Pinches (1975), who document that
CAPM beta is higher for lower-rated issuers.35 However, although CAPM beta is strongly
related to rating overall, we ￿nd that the relationship is weaker than it is for failure beta,
which explains 95% of variation in rating. Furthermore, CAPM beta explains a much smaller
share of the variation in rating for investment grade issuers (68%) than does failure beta (95%).
The pattern for CDS risk premia is similar: CAPM beta explains 50% of the variation in risk
premia across investment grade ￿rms compared to 91% of variation explained by failure beta.
We conjecture that this pattern is due to the greater ability of failure beta to identify o⁄ bad
times, such as severe crises and recessions.
To investigate this hypothesis we also consider up and down beta, which are simply esti-
mates of CAPM beta that condition respectively on positive and negative equity index excess
returns. If stock returns are non-linearly related to market returns, then up and down beta
35Consistent with this ￿nding, Kaplan and Urwitz (1979) ￿nd that both accounting ratios and CAPM
beta contain information about rating.
29can be di⁄erent and risk premia may be more strongly related to downside risk as measured
by down beta (Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006)). If failure beta has a greater ability to identify
sensitivity to bad times than CAPM beta, we would expect down beta to be related more
closely to rating than up beta. This is indeed what we ￿nd.
The relationship between beta and rating and between beta and risk premia is strongest
for failure beta, followed by down beta, then followed by CAPM beta. When considering
investment grade only (panel B) the relationships are similar, but more pronounced. Up beta
is not signi￿cant and enters with a counterintuitive negative coe¢ cient estimate both when
explaining variation in rating as well as risk premia. These results suggest that failure beta
captures more of the variation in rating and risk premia than CAPM beta because failure
beta is better at measuring the risk of negative events. The fact that failure beta captures
more variation than down beta suggests that failure beta measures somewhat more extreme
downside risk than down beta. Since a negative market return of ordinary magnitude should
not increase the default probability of a typical investment grade issuer by very much, it is
likely that failure beta measures exposure to a more drastic event than an average negative
market return month and that this is the reason for its greater ability to explain variation in
risk premia.
We conclude that the relationship between rating and systematic risk is robust to alternative
measures of systematic risk, though the relationship with rating and risk premia is strongest
with failure beta. We argue that this is because failure beta directly measures the tendency of
issuers￿credit quality to deteriorate in bad times. These are the risks that diversi￿ed corporate
bond investors care about and ratings seem to re￿ ect this. Moreover, market participants seem
to set prices in accordance with this idea given that failure beta is most closely related to CDS
risk premia.
4.5 Systematic risk and long-run default probability
In this last subsection, we investigate one ￿nal possibility. Since systematic default risk and
long-run ￿rm-speci￿c default risk are positively related, credit ratings may end up being related
to systematic default risk because they focus on measuring long-run default probability. We
30now present evidence that this is not the case: Long-run ￿rm-level default probability varies
both because of di⁄erences in systematic risk as well as because there is important ￿rm-level
idiosyncratic variation in default probability. Thus long-run default probability and systematic
risk represent di⁄erent attributes of risk, and ratings appear more closely related to systematic
risk.
Earlier we showed evidence in favor of this ￿nding: Default probability contains both a
systematic as well as an idiosyncratic component (table 5), which means that an optimal
measure of default probability cannot be the same as a measure of systematic risk. Also,
ratings, which we show measure systematic risk, underperform failure score when predicting
failure at ten-year horizons (table 3), and are thus sub-optimal predictors of long-run default.
In table 8 we decompose default probability into a systematic component (multiplying
failure beta and median default probability) and an idiosyncratic component (the remainder).36
If all the information about long run default probability were captured by systematic risk , we
would expect that idiosyncratic default risk should have no additional explanatory power to
predict ￿rm-level default at long horizons. Panel A shows that this is not the case. Although
our measure of systematic risk is a strong predictor of default at 1-, 5- and 10-year horizons,
the combined failure score is better, increasing pseudo-R2 at 10-year horizons from 16.4%
(systematic risk only) to 18.7%, and adding more power at all shorter horizons. When both
components of our default probability estimates are included separately (panel B), both are
strongly statistically signi￿cant. For comparison we also report the pseudo-R2 for rating only
and ￿nd that it is lower than systematic risk and failure score at all horizons.37
However, ratings are not related to systematic risk by virtue of their measuring long-run
default risk: ratings relate primarily to systematic risk rather than ￿rm-level default proba-
bility. The ￿nal column of each panel shows results from regressing rating on each component
separately. As expected, rating is strongly related to systematic risk, but it is not well ex-
36Speci￿cally, we calculate the log odds ratio of ￿Pmedian
t . We then subtract this quantity from
failure score to measure the idiosyncratic component.
37We note that this check underscores the robustness of the patterns in relative forecast accuracy we
present in table 3: Estimating failure beta and multiplying it by the common component of default
probability does not outperform failure score at any horizon.
31plained by the idiosyncratic component of default probability (panel A). When including both
components (panel B) we ￿nd that the systematic component is very important while the idio-
syncratic component does not add any explanatory power. We conclude that long-run default
prediction and systematic default risk are economically and statistically distinguishable and
that credit rating is more closely related to systematic risk than to long-run default risk.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the information in corporate credit ratings relevant to investors
concerned about credit risk. We show that ratings relate to two economically di⁄erent aspects
of credit risk: raw default probability (expected payo⁄) and systematic default risk, or the
tendency to default in bad times (discount rate). We ￿rst demonstrate that ratings are not
an optimal predictor of default probability: they are dominated by a simple default prediction
model based on publicly available accounting and market based measures; they explain little
of the variation in default probability across ￿rms; and they fail to capture the considerable
variation in default probabilities and empirical failure rate over the business cycle. This means
that either credit ratings are simply not at the frontier of default prediction or that delivering
optimal default probability forecasts is not the sole objective of rating agencies. We present
evidence that the latter is the case. In particular, we show that ratings are strongly related to
systematic risk, as measured by failure beta, and that systematic risk is economically distinct
from long-run idiosyncratic default risk. It should perhaps not be surprising that ratings
re￿ ect systematic risk: in theory, a diversi￿ed risk-averse investor should care about both
default probability and systematic risk, and we show empirically that systematic default risk
is priced in CDS risk premia. Nevertheless, this relationship between rating and systematic
risk has not been well-appreciated or explored in the previous literature.
If rating agencies are in fact targeting systematic risk we can explain a number of otherwise
puzzling features about ratings. First, it is less surprising that ratings are dominated in
predicting default: a single measure by design cannot be both an optimal default forecast and
a measure of systematic risk. Second, the ￿nding that ratings re￿ ect systematic risk can help
32rationalize agencies￿practice of rating through the cycle ￿sensitivity to bad times may not
change over the business cycle. Third, the fact that ratings capture systematic risk may help
to explain why investors pay so much attention to ratings, even though they are not optimal
predictors of default, and why ratings are strongly related to bond risk premia.
Our results also speak to the ongoing policy debate regarding the appropriate role of ratings
agencies and the call for potential alternatives to credit ratings. Our ￿ndings imply that, given
the nature of credit risk, a narrow focus on only one measure of credit quality must necessarily
result in a loss of information, in particular in default prediction accuracy. Since there is no
restriction that states that credit risk has to be summarized by only one measure or that such
a measure needs to be either smooth or insensitive to aggregate credit conditions, it follows
that rating (or any one measure) cannot be an optimal measure of credit quality. Instead, it is
fruitful to break out default prediction from the measurement of systematic risk. The former
measure could update frequently and rapidly and respond to ￿rm-speci￿c news while the latter
could be a combination of current credit ratings and aggregate credit conditions.
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37year firms failures rate (%) firms failures rate (%)
1963-1975 2218 50 0.14 . . .
1976-1985 4645 339 0.68 . . .
1986 5896 101 1.71 907 20 2.20
1987 6331 58 0.92 999 9 0.90
1988 6445 94 1.46 974 30 3.08
1989 6346 77 1.21 932 11 1.18
1990 6269 80 1.28 889 8 0.90
1991 6291 72 1.14 873 15 1.72
1992 6622 49 0.74 913 5 0.55
1993 7149 40 0.56 988 7 0.71
1994 7793 33 0.42 1082 4 0.37
1995 8099 43 0.53 1156 5 0.43
1996 8474 34 0.40 1288 5 0.39
1997 9273 61 0.66 1482 9 0.61
1998 9572 148 1.55 1647 10 0.61
1999 9270 207 2.23 1741 39 2.24
2000 9018 167 1.85 1719 34 1.98
2001 8379 333 39 7 1691 67 39 6
Panel A: Failures over time
Table 1: Failures over time - all firms and rated firms
all firms rated firms
Panel A lists the number of firms and failures for all active firms (1963 to 2008) and for all firms with a S&P
credit rating (1986 to 2008). Failure is defined as the first of bankruptcy (chapter 7, chapter 11), de-listing for
performance related reason, default (D) or selective default (SD) rating, and government-led bailout. The
number of firms is the average number of firms in a given year or over a given range of years. Firms are
included as active if they have either available accounting or equity market data. Panel B reports failure rates
during the 12 months after NBER recessions and financial crises (October 1987, September 1998).
2001 8379 333 3.97 1691 67 3.96
2002 7757 229 2.95 1646 50 3.04
2003 7334 165 2.25 1597 32 2.00
2004 6777 38 0.56 1633 14 0.86
2005 6781 36 0.53 1631 16 0.98
2006 6786 18 0.27 1613 6 0.37
2007 6919 24 0.35 1544 6 0.39
2008 6896 50 0.73 1454 27 1.86
months failures rate (%) months failures rate (%)
normal 359 1167 0.75 183 175 0.89
recession 167 1039 1.42 67 187 2.41
crisis 26 340 1.98 26 67 2.27
Panel B: Failures during and after recessions and crises
all firms rated firms(1) (2)





















Pseudo R-squared 0.316 0.118
Accuracy ratio 0.955 0.862
Table 2: Failure prediction in a logit model
Logit model (1963 to 2008)
This table reports results from logit regressions of the failure indicator for all active firms including
unrated firms on a set of monthly explanatory variables defined as follows (the model is the same as
in Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)): weighted average of net income over market value of
total assets over the previous 12 months (NIMTAAVG), total liabilities over market value of total
assets (TLMTA), weighted average of annualized log excess return relative to value-weighted S&P
500 return over the previous 12 months (EXRETAVG), log of firm’s market equity over the total
valuation of S&P 500 (RSIZE), square root of the sum of squared firm stock returns over the
previous three-month period, annualized (SIGMA), stock of cash and short term investments over
the market value of total assets (CASHMTA), market-to-book ratio of the firm (MB), and log of price
per share winsorized above $15 (PRICE). Market value of total assets is the sum of market value of
firm equity and total liabilities. Z-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using standard
errors that are robust and clustered by year; ** denotes significant at 1%.prediction month 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
Pseudo R-squared
   failure score only 40.0% 34.8% 28.1% 19.8% 9.1% 6.8% 4.9% 3.1%
   credit rating only 29.2% 20.6% 16.0% 12.0% 8.4% 7.2% 6.4% 5.4%
   both 42.4% 35.9% 29.2% 21.1% 11.2% 8.8% 7.1% 5.6%
Accuracy Ratio
   failure score only 97.0% 96.2% 94.5% 91.8% 83.3% 79.5% 76.8% 72.0%
   credit rating only 93.2% 90.3% 88.0% 84.7% 80.8% 79.1% 78.2% 76.2%
   both 97.4% 96.5% 95.1% 92.2% 84.9% 82.0% 80.0% 76.7%
prediction month 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
failure score 0.802 0.929 0.968 1.033 0.831 0.806 0.653 0.388
(14.10)** (28.04)** (29.10)** (16.72)** (15.49)** (9.32)** (5.58)** (2.16)*
credit rating 0.307 0.180 0.166 0.170 0.207 0.201 0.213 0.222
(4.01)** (4.52)** (5.00)** (4.41)** (8.74)** (6.71)** (8.26)** (8.60)**
# of observations 341,287 336,994 329,946 313,911 278,381 245,150 215,796 189,557
# of failures 340 401 429 437 370 282 231 186
years 123457 1 0
Pseudo R-squared
   failure score only 41.4% 33.3% 28.1% 25.5% 23.2% 20.6% 18.9%
   credit rating only 24.1% 21.4% 19.6% 18.7% 18.0% 16.5% 14.8%
   both 42.7% 35.4% 30.8% 28.6% 26.7% 24.0% 22.0%
Panel C: Cumulative prediction accuracy
Table 3: Failure score vs. S&P credit ratings (1986 to 2008)
Panel A: Accuracy of failure prediction
Panel B: Coefficients on failure predictors in the 'both' specification
This table reports results from monthly logit regressions of our failure indicator on failure score (computed using data for the
full sample corresponding to the methodology used in Table 2) and S&P long-term credit rating (AAA=1, AA+=2, …, CCC-
=19, CC=20, C=21). We estimate logit specifications using data lagged 1, 3, 6, 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months. The sample
period is from 1986 to 2008 and contains rated companies only, while failure score is estimated using the full sample of all
active firms. Panel A reports McFadden's pseudo R-squared and accuracy ratio as measures of model performance. Panel
B reports coefficients on failure score and rating when both are included. Z-statistics (reported in parentheses) are
calculated using standard errors that are robust and clustered by year; ** denotes significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
Panel C reports performance measures when forecasting failure events every January over the next 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 10
years using 12-month failure score (from Table 2).(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(failure probability) 0.612 0.442 0.713
(4.45)** (6.01)** (7.43)**
R-squared (overall) 64.5% 75.2% 77.7% 82.6% 76.5% 83.7%
R-squared (within) 30.0% 30.5%
Rating fixed effects XXXX
Year fixed effects XX
Firm fixed effects XX
Number of observations:  38,569
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Table 4: Information in default probabilities and failure score
Panel A reports results from regressions of log(CDS spread) on log(12-month failure probability) and sets of
dummy variables: S&P credit rating, year, and firm. CDS spread data are from Markit and are end-of-month
spreads for the 5-year contract. The sample period is 2001 to 2007. All firms with CDS spread, ratings, and
available default probability data in the CRSP-COMPUSTAT universe are included. t-statistics (reported in
parentheses) are calculated using standard errors that are robust, clustered by month, and corrected for
autocorrelation; ** denotes significant at 1%. Panel B reports results from logit regressions of downgrades (a
decrease in S&P credit rating, e.g. from BB to BB-) on 12-month failure score estimated using the model in Table 2.
Z-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors that are robust and clustered by year.
Panel A: Explaining variation in CDS spreads using default probability
Panel B: Predicting downgrades using failure score
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Failure score 1.068 1.080
(26.55)** (26.37)**
Pseudo R-squared 1.3% 10.6% 2.4% 11.4%
Accuracy Ratio 58.0% 75.3% 62.7% 76.4%
Rating fixed effect XXXX
Year fixed effect XX
Number of observations: 340,496









AAA 0.38 0.06 9.9% 9.2%
AA+ 0.52 0.09 19.0% 11.0%
AA 0.53 0.07 16.9% 13.0%
AA- 0.57 0.08 20.1% 11.3%
A+ 0.60 0.07 21.2% 9.4%
A 0.61 0.07 16.5% 8.2%
A- 0.73 0.06 20.5% 10.6%
BBB+ 0.86 0.05 15.4% 8.6%
BBB 0.91 0.06 14.8% 8.3%
BBB- 1.10 0.07 17.0% 8.6%
BB+ 1.78 0.08 9.1% 5.3%
BB 2.10 0.13 9.8% 6.3%
BB- 2.57 0.11 10.4% 5.7%
B+ 3.36 0.24 5.4% 3.0%
B 4.60 0.79 6.4% 2.8%
Table 5: Failure beta
We report results of regressions of firm-level 12-month default probability (annualized) on
the common component of default probability (proxied by median default probability).
Regressions are estimated using default probability changes, are run by rating, and include
firm fixed effects. Standard errors are robust and clustered by month. We report the
percentage of firm-level variation of default probability explained by the common component
of default probability (within R
2) both for default probability levels and changes.
B- 4.91 0.72 3.6% 2.1%
CCC+ 4.96 1.53 2.6% 0.6%
CCC 8.44 1.79 5.0% 1.1%(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(failure beta) 1.90 1.96 1.41 1.57
(9.29)** (9.61)** (16.18)** (3.10)**




Year fixed effects XX
R-squared (overall) 82.9% 93.1% 96.8% 84.3%
R-squared (within) 92.6% 96.6%
Number of observations: 108
Table 6: Regression of risk premia on failure beta
This table reports results from regressions of log risk premium (calculated using 1-year cumulative
default probability using our logit model and recovery rates from Markit) on failure beta and default
probability. t-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using standard errors that are robust,
clustered by year, and corrected for autocorrelation; ** denotes significant at 1%, * significant at 5%.
We include median annual observations for 16 rating groups. For rating groups 15 and 16 there is no
data for 2001 and for rating group 17 there is no data for 2001-2002, resulting in a total of 108
observations.Coefficient R-squared Coefficient R-squared
failure beta (log) 12.41 95.5% 1.96 92.6%
(18.38)** (9.61)**
CAPM beta 16.24 87.4% 2.34 81.0%
(10.53)** (5.52)**
Up beta 23.81 50.0% 3.40 50.6%
(4.00)** (3.50)**
Down beta 12.09 93.0% 1.78 86.8%
(14.63)** (6.87)**
failure beta (log) 21.79 94.9% 3.16 90.7%
(12.20)** (8.10)**
CAPM beta 29.01 68.0% 3.76 50.0%
(4.12)** (3.44)**
Up beta -19.65 16.6% -2.52 8.6%
(1.26) (1.41)
Down beta 18.78 86.4% 2.78 69.6%
(7.12)** (4.18)**
Panel B: Investment grade only
This table reports results from regressions of rating and risk premia on different measures of systematic risk
(failure beta, CAPM equity beta, up beta, down beta). Panel A reports results when including 18 rating groups
and Panel B reports results for investment grade issuers (rated AAA to BBB-). For risk premia calculations we
use median annual risk premia by rating. CAPM equity beta is estimated using equally-weighted equity portfolio
returns; up beta and down beta are estimated by allowing the coefficient on the market factor RM (from Ken
French's website) to vary for the factor being below and above 0. For regressions of risk premia on beta we
include year fixed effects and report within-R
2; standard errors are robust and clustered by year as well as
adjusted for autocorrelation.




risk premia on beta
Panel A: Investment grade and non-investment grade1-year 5-year 10-year rating
Credit rating 21.3% 17.8% 14.6%
Systematic (beta*PD) 22.7% 19.7% 16.4% 94.4%
Failure score (systematic + idiosyncratic) 33.2% 23.1% 18.7% 25.1%
systematic (beta*PD) 2.07 1.78 1.59 4.93
(12.44)** (24.42)** (31.76)** (22.60)**
idiosyncratic (alpha + e) 1.38 0.82 0.73 -0.02
(19.80)** (13.42)** (12.37)** (0.26)
Number of observations 26,941 26,941 26,941 26,941
Table 8: Using systematic and idiosyncratic default probability to explain
variation in long run default probabilty and credit rating 
In this table we explore the extent to which systematic and idiosyncratic default probability contributes to explaining variation
in long run default probability and credit rating. We break up a firm's default probability into two components: systematic
default probability (the company's default probability due to its exposure to the common component of default probability) and
idiosyncratic default probability (the remainder of the default probability). Specific definitions of the two components are
provided in the text of the paper. Panel A reports explanatory power; when predicting long run default we report pseudo R
2 for
logit regressions (same as in Table 3), to explain variation in credit rating we use OLS regressions including year fixed effects. 
Panel B reports coefficients on the systematic and idiosyncratic components of defaut probability when both are included
separately. Standard errors are robust, clustered by year and, where appropriate, corrected for serial correlation.
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A A A 2345678 B B B 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 C C
S&P credit rating
This figure plots the percentiles of the de-medianed 12-month failure probability, annualized (10th, 25th, median, 75th, 90th of the distribution), 
by S&P credit rating (AAA=1, AA+=2, …, CCC-=19, CC=20). The failure probability is the annualized 12-month failure probability (from Table  yg ( )p y py (
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1986m1 1988m1 1990m1 1992m1 1994m1 1996m1 1998m1 2000m1 2002m1 2004m1 2006m1 2008m1
Date
This figure plots the median,and total liability-weighted mean 12-month failure probability, as well as the common factor from 1986 to 2008. It  gp , yg py ,
also plots the annual empirical failure rate, which is normalized to the mean predicted failure probability for ease of comparison. The annual 
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S&P credit rating
This figure plots the failure beta (12-month failure sensitivities) by S&P credit rating.  The failure beta is measured as the coefficient from a 





















Figure 7: Risk premium and failure beta
-1.75
-0.6 -0.3 0 0.3 0.6 0.9
Failure beta (log)
This figure plots the failure beta (12-month failure sensitivities), calculated by S&P credit rating, and median risk CDS premium (de-meaned 
by year) for each year from 2001 to 2007.  The risk premium is calculated using the 1-year cumulative default probability, the 1-year USD 
swap rates as the risk-free rate, and Markit recovery values.